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Abstract
We examine banking competition when deposit or loan contracts contingent on
macroeconomic shocks become feasible. We show that the risk allocation is ef-
ﬁcient, provided that banks are not bailed out. In this case, banks may shift
part of the risk to depositors. The private sector insures the banking sector and
banking crises are avoided. In contrast, when banks are bailed out, depositors
receive non-contingent contracts with high interest rates, while entrepreneurs
obtain loan contracts that demand high repayment in good times and low repay-
ment in bad times. As a result, the present generation overinvests, and banks
create large macroeconomic risks for future generations, even if the underlying
risk is small or zero.
Keywords: Financial intermediation, macroeconomic risks, state contingent
contracts, banking regulation.
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The literature provides ample evidence that the costs of banking crises, in terms of
GDP losses, may become very large. These banking crises are often caused by neg-
ative macroeconomic shocks. Gorton (1988) conducts a seminal empirical study to
diﬀerentiate between the sunspot view and the business-cycle view of banking crises.
He ﬁnds that bank panics are systematically linked to business cycles. Subsequent
work by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Detragiache (1998)
provide further evidence for factors that may cause ﬁnancial fragilities and that could
ultimately lead to banking crises. These results suggest that banking crises tend to
erupt when the macroeconomic environment is weak.
It is a widely held view that traditional contractual arrangements in banking expose
the banks to the risks associated with systematic or macroeconomic1 shocks, and that
this may be ineﬃcient (see e.g. Hellwig 1998). Ways in which deposit and loan con-
tracts might be designed to reduce macroeconomic risks on the balance sheets of banks
appear to be one of the most important research issues related to banking crises. A
promising way to solve the problem might be to induce banks to make deposit and
loan contracts contingent on macroeconomic events, such as GDP growth, or other
contractible macroeconomic indicators that are highly correlated with the ﬁnancial
health of the banking sector.
In this paper, we examine the consequences when conditioning of loan and deposit
contracts on real shocks becomes feasible for banks.2 Our analysis is both a normative
and positive exercise. On the positive side, we examine the consequences if contingent
deposit and loan contracts become feasible and are introduced. On the normative side,
we explore how diﬀerent regulatory approaches toward insolvent banks aﬀect these
consequences and whether the outcomes are socially desirable.
We consider a simple model in which banks alleviate agency problems in ﬁnancial
1We use the terms systematic and macroeconomic shocks as synonyms.
2How contracts can be made dependent on macroeconomic risk by deﬁning and maintainig stan-
dardized macro indices has been examined and discussed extensively by Shiller (e.g. Shiller (2003)).
We will comment on the range of the possible macroeconomic indicators in our model in the concluding
section.
2contracting. Banks compete for funds and oﬀer credit contracts to potential borrowers.
We allow for macroeconomic shocks aﬀecting the average productivity of investment
projects.
We distinguish between bailout and failure, depending on whether insolvent banks are
bailed out or have to go bankrupt. The main conclusions are as follows: Suppose that
the regulator commits to bankruptcy for insolvent banks. Thus, ﬁnancial intermedi-
ation with contingent contracts yields an eﬃcient risk allocation. If macroeconomic
shocks are small, depositors and entrepreneurs are oﬀered non-contingent deposit and
loan contracts. All macroeconomic risk is borne by entrepreneurs. The inside funds
of entrepreneurs act as a buﬀer for macroeconomic risks. If macroeconomic shocks are
larger, banks write state-contingent contracts for depositors and debtors. Part of the
macroeconomic risk is shifted to consumers, since entrepreneurs cannot bear the entire
risk. Consumers and entrepreneurs together insure the banking sector, and banking
crises are avoided.
The risk allocation changes completely if bank deposits are guaranteed and hence, fu-
ture generations provide funds to pay back banks’ obligations to the previous generation
in order to prevent them from becoming insolvent. With bailout, competing banks try
to generate a proﬁtable (positive intermediation margin) and a non-proﬁtable (negative
intermediation margin) state of the world. In the good state with high productivity
of investment projects, they request high loan interest rates from entrepreneurs. In
order to motivate entrepreneurs to invest rather than to save, banks request very low
repayments in the bad state with low productivity of investment projects. Deposit
rates are non-contingent, since deposits are insured by the next generation.
Competition among banks for the creation of a proﬁtable state pushes deposit rates up
to the high repayment of entrepreneurs in that state. As a result, banks create a state
of the world with high repayment obligations to depositors, but with very low pay-back
requirements for entrepreneurs. This creates large risks for future generations, even
if the underlying risk is small or zero. This is called the risk-generation eﬀect. As a
consequence of the risk-generation eﬀect, the present generation receives higher interest
rates on savings than in a situation with bank failures. This induces overinvestment
3among the current generation at the expense of future generations.
Allowing for the issuing of equity does not alleviate the incentive for banks to create
proﬁtable and non-proﬁtable states under the bailout regime. In competition, banks
are unable to raise equity. Shareholders demand at least the same expected returns on
equity as the ones depositors receive. This is, however, infeasible, as future generations
repay deposits but not equity. Capital-adequacy rules are necessary to induce suﬃcient
bank capital.
Our paper is related to the recent discussions on regulatory issues regarding ﬁnancial
intermediaries. Firstly, our model may explain that competition of ﬁnancial interme-
diaries with contingent deposit and loan contracts under a bailout system increases
the underlying aggregate risk, since banks compete to create proﬁtable states of the
world. The usual regulatory discussion has focused on the behavior of single institu-
tions (see e.g. Dewatripont and Tirole 1994), or on the incidence of aggregate risk
on the banking system without contingent contracts (Blum and Hellwig 1995 and also
Gehrig 1997). The former literature has pointed out and tested (e.g. Keeley 1990) that
a low charter value increases a bank’s incentive to take on risk. Our model shows that
this risk-taking incentive for bank managers is complemented by the risk-generating
eﬀect we introduce in this paper. Even if the underlying productivity risk is small or
zero, competition among banks with contingent contracts under a bailout approach
yields large macroeconomic risks for future generations.
Secondly, it has been pointed out by Hellwig (1995, 1998) that it is unclear why the
terms of the deposit contracts cannot be made contingent on aggregate events, such
as productivity shocks or ﬂuctuations in the gross domestic product. Hellwig [1998]
oﬀers three explanations for this phenomenon: lack of awareness among contractors,
moral hazard in banking, transaction costs and the market-making role of ﬁnancial
intermediaries. Our model indicates that bailouts of banking crises or explicit deposit
insurance will not lead to contingent deposit contracts, even if they become feasible,
but to contingent loan contracts with very large diﬀerences in state-dependent repay-
ments. State-dependent deposit contracts only occur for large productivity shocks and
a regulatory scheme that induces bankruptcy of insolvent banks. Our analysis indicates
4that making deposit and loan contracts contingent on variations in aggregate income
under a bailout approach is ineﬃcient and should even be prevented by regulatory
action.
Thirdly, there are empirical parallels to our results. Inﬂation-indexed or Forex-related
loan and deposit contracts in Latin America and South-east Asia appeared to have con-
tributed to macroeconomic instability and hollowed out the banking system through
defaults.3 This suggests that contracts contingent on macroeconomic factors may trig-
ger, or contribute to, banking crises. Our argument is that ﬁnancial intermediation
with deposit and loan contracts contingent on macroeconomic shocks can imply bank-
ing instability when such schemes are oﬀered competitively under bailout schemes.
Fourth, at a more general level, our investigation indicates that new contractual oppor-
tunities, i.e. the possibility to make deposit and loan contracts contingent on macroe-
conomic shocks, may increase both aggregate credit and ﬁnancial instabilities. Our
exercise is complementary to the important insights in Shin (2008), that securitization
enables credit expansion through higher leverage of the ﬁnancial system as a whole,
while the impact on ﬁnancial stability is ambiguous.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model. In the third
section, we derive the equilibrium in the intermediation market without the presence of
macroeconomic shocks. In section four, we introduce temporary productivity shocks,
state-contingent deposit and loan contracts, and regulatory schemes. In sections ﬁve
and six, we examine small and large productivity shocks under diﬀerent regulatory
schemes. Section seven presents our conclusions.
2 Model
We consider a generation of agents living for two periods. For most of our analyses,
it will be suﬃcient to look at the generation born in a particular period t. However,
regulatory policies such as bailouts will require the existence of more than one gen-
eration to guarantee credible deposit insurance by taxing future generations. Further
3I am grateful to a referee for this argument.
5generations are introduced as needed.
The generation under consideration consists of a continuum of agents, indexed by
[0,1]. There are two classes of agents in each generation. A fraction η of individuals
are potential entrepreneurs. The rest, 1−η, of the population are consumers. Potential
entrepreneurs and consumers diﬀer in that only the former have access to investment
technologies. There is one physical perishable good that can be used for consumption
or investment. Each individual in each generation receives an endowment e of the good
when young and none when old.
Each entrepreneur has access to a production project that converts time t goods into
time t+1 goods. The required funds for an investment project are F : = e+I. Hence,
an entrepreneur must borrow I units of the goods in order to undertake the investment
project. The class of entrepreneurs is not homogeneous. We assume that entrepreneurs
are indexed by a quality parameter q uniformly distributed on [qt−1,qt], qt > 1, in the
population of entrepreneurs. If an entrepreneur of type q obtains additional resources
I and decides to invest, he realizes investment returns in the next period of:
q(I + e). (1)
qt is the aggregate indicator of the productivity of investment projects in period t. If qt
is uncertain in period t−1, generation t−1 faces macroeconomic risk. For simplicity,
we assume that potential entrepreneurs are risk neutral and are only concerned with
consumption in their old age, i.e., they do not consume when young. Consumers
consume in both periods. They have utility functions u(c1
t,c2
t) deﬁned over consumption
in the two periods. The variables c1
t,c2
t are the consumption of the consumer born in
period t when young and old respectively. Consumers are risk-averse. If a household
can transfer wealth between the two periods at a riskless real interest rate, denoted
by rt, the solution of the household’s intertemporal consumption problem generates
the saving function, denoted by s{rt}. We follow the standard assumptions in the
OG literature that the substitution eﬀect (weakly) dominates the income eﬀect, i.e.,
savings are a weakly increasing function of the interest rate. We drop the time index
whenever convenient.
6The rationale for the underlying banking model we are using and the nature of contracts
that arise are developed in Gersbach and Uhlig (2006), who abstract from macroeco-
nomic shocks. In Appendix B, we summarize this rationale. For the purpose of this
paper, we concentrate on the consequences when banks compete with deposit and loan
contracts contingent on macroeconomic shocks.
For all our arguments, it will be suﬃcient that two banks exist and compete.4 Hence,
we assume that there are two banks, indexed by j, which ﬁnance entrepreneurs. We
assume that banks are owned by entrepreneurs. First, we discuss the nature of contracts
oﬀered by banks indexed by j = 1,2. Bank j can sign deposit contracts D(rd
j) where
1 + rd
j is the repayment oﬀered for one unit of resources. Loan contracts of bank j
are denoted by C(rc
j) where 1 + rc
j is the repayment required from entrepreneurs for
one unit of funds.5 If macroeconomic risk is present, we allow for contracts to be
conditioned on the realization of qt or on the resulting GDP in period t − 1. In such
cases, state contingent deposit or loan contracts can be written.
Note that the availability of production technologies from period t to t + 1 allows
depositors and entrepreneurs of each generation to trade amongst themselves.6 Gen-
erations are connected by ﬁnancial intermediaries which represent the sole long-living
institution. A new generation is aﬀected by the preceding generation when banks have
accumulated either proﬁts or losses. In the former case, a generation may buy the
shares of the banks. Our focus is on Bertrand competition, therefore the price of bank
shares is zero. Thus, this case is trivial and shall be disregarded. In the latter case, a
generation may be forced by regulation or may wish to rescue banks by fulﬁlling the
obligations to the preceding depositors. This will be the focus of our analysis. Losses
of banks will only occur if aggregate risk is present and, hence, there is uncertainty
about qt.
Finally, we have to specify the objectives of banks that are owned by risk-neutral
entrepreneurs. We assume that banks maximize expected proﬁts and hence internalize
4As we focus on Bertrand competition, an extension to more than two banks is straightforward.
5In the optimal contract entrepreneurs must invest their endowments if they apply for loans.
Otherwise, shirking would become attractive and would deter banks from lending.
6In this model, intergenerational trade does not improve autarky for all generations. In particular,
insuring depositors against the macroeconomic risk by taxing future generations will make the future
generations worse oﬀ.
7losses that accrue to depositors, in case their claims cannot be fully served. We shall
focus on expected proﬁts and not on return on equity. We do this for two reasons.
First, the case of return on equity maximization is equal to the case of bailout as share-
holders have zero returns in the event of losses. Hence, our results will automatically
cover the case of equity return maximization.
Second, expected proﬁt maximization is a realistic scenario since bankers may suﬀer
a utility loss in the event of default. Such utility losses may occur because there are
non-pecuniary penalties associated with default. The non-pecuniary utility loss may
occur because career opportunities decline and/or the reputation is destroyed.7 Utility
losses in the event of default could also occur if bankers are ﬁnanced through wages
and bonuses that vary with proﬁts. Our assumption is that utility losses of managers
lead to internalization of depositors’ losses.8
3 Equilibrium without Macroeconomic Shocks
We begin with a discussion of the case where macroeconomic shocks are exempted, as
this will prove useful in understanding the results presented later in this paper. Obvi-
ously deposit and loan contracts will have a length of one period, as no transformation
of maturities needs to take place. We examine the following four-stage intermediation
game for the generation under consideration.
Period t
1. Banks oﬀer deposit contracts to consumers and entrepreneurs.
2. Banks oﬀer credit contracts to entrepreneurs.
3. Consumers and entrepreneurs decide which contracts to accept. Resources are
exchanged. Entrepreneurs start producing subject to macroeconomic risk.
7This may be actively promoted by bank regulators, when they investigate and punish failures by
bank managers.
8Strictly speaking, we assume that utility losses of bank managers are at the level that leads to
complete internalization of potential losses experienced by depositors.
8Period t + 1
4. Production ends. Entrepreneurs pay back. Banks pay back depositors.
The game is a multi-stage game with observed actions. That is, actions at each stage
are chosen simultaneously, and players know the actions in all previous stages when
they enter the next stage. In the following we discuss the main assumptions of the
intermediation game. We assume that banks cannot ration deposit contracts in stage
3.9 If a bank does not have enough deposits to lend to all candidate borrowers, loans
are rationed. In such a case, we assume that the loan applicants at the said bank are
rationed with the same probability, such that loan volume and deposits are balanced.
We next consider the loan application decision of an entrepreneur with quality q, given
that he observes rd
j, rc
j of banks. If he obtains a loan, he also has an incentive to invest,
since banks can completely alleviate agency problems in contracting. If he applies for
a loan at the bank oﬀering the lowest loan rate, his terminal wealth or consumption
W(q) will amount to
W(q) = q(e + I) − I(1 + min{r
c
j}) (2)
If he does not apply, he obtains e(1 + max{rd
j}) by saving his endowments. Thus, there












which motivates entrepreneurs with q ≥ q∗ to apply for loans and entrepreneurs with
q < q∗ to save.
We assume that entrepreneurs are contract takers and thus make loan application
decisions with the assumption that they will not be rationed at banks that oﬀer the
highest deposit rate. Using this scheme, all entrepreneurs apply to banks with the
lowest loan rate, within the set of banks that oﬀer the highest deposit rate.10 If
entrepreneurs seeking loans were rejected, they choose to save at the banks that oﬀer
9This assumption coincides with current regulations in most countries.
10As only those banks will obtain deposits, it is intuitive that entrepreneurs seeking loans only apply
at those banks. We could relax the assumption by modelling entrepreneurs as contract takers at any
bank, which, however, complicates the analysis considerably.
9the highest deposit rate. In all equilibria studied in this paper, the entrepreneurs
applying for loans are not rationed and thus their expectations are correct.11
Note that we have assumed that banks can ensure investment and can verify output con-
ditional on investment. Thus, they are not concerned about low-quality entrepreneurs
applying, since such entrepreneurs would have less consumption than with saving en-
dowments. Banks are assumed to maximize expected proﬁts. The assumption has
been justiﬁed in detail in section 2. Hence, conditional on granting a credit to an
entrepreneur and receiving funds from savers, proﬁts per credit of a bank j amount to:
Gj = I(1 + r
c






j) = I∆j (4)
∆j is the intermediation margin of bank j. In order to derive the intermediation
equilibrium, we assume that savings are never suﬃcient to fund all entrepreneurs.
Since the deposit rate rd
j cannot exceed ¯ q −1 without causing losses for banks, and we
have assumed that the savings of consumers are weakly increasing in the deposit rate,
a suﬃcient condition is:
(1 − η)s{¯ q − 1} < η I (5)
We also assume that investments exceed savings at zero deposit and loan interest rates.
In this case q∗ = 1 and entrepreneurs with q ≥ 1 apply for loans, while entrepreneurs
with q < 1 save their endowments. Therefore, we assume
(1 − η)s[0] + η e
¡
1 − (q − 1)
¢
< η (q − 1)I. (6)
Together, the boundary conditions ensure that savings and investment can be balanced
at positive interest rates. Finally, we assume that banks that are unable to pay back
go bankrupt.
A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium among banks with myopic beliefs of entrepreneurs
is a tuple
11Other rationing schemes might be considered where rejected entrepreneurs go to another bank in
order to apply for loans. In an extended version we show that the result in Proposition 1 is robust for
diﬀerent rationing schemes. The main argument is that more sophisticated rationing schemes tend to
lower the proﬁts of banks that deviate from an equilibrium. Details are available upon request. As
















• entrepreneurs take optimal credit application and saving decisions as contract
takers,
• no bank has an incentive to oﬀer diﬀerent deposit or loan interest rates.
Therefore, the strategy spaces of banks are deposit and loan contracts.12 In the ap-
pendix it is shown:
Proposition 1









(ii) r∗ is determined by




∗ − (¯ q − 1)
´




∗ = 1 + r
∗
Hence, the intermediation game yields the competitive outcome in which savings and
investments are balanced and in which there is a common interest rate for loans and
deposits. For the purpose of this paper, the most important conclusion from proposition
1 is that intermediation margins are zero in equilibrium and savings and investments
are balanced.
Note that in our model, the incentive of banks to corner one side of the market, in order
to obtain monopoly rents on the other side, does not destroy the perfect competition
12Interest rates on deposits and loans are usually constrained in such a way that repayments of
debtors in stage 4 are non-negative.
11outcome.13 Suppose a bank oﬀers a deposit rate slightly above r∗ in order to attract
all depositors. If this bank raises rc in order to exploit its monopoly power among
entrepreneurs, a portion of entrepreneurs will switch market sides. This, however,
causes large excess resources for the deviating bank, inducing a loss greater than the
excess returns from the remaining entrepreneurs. The market side switching and the
resulting excess resources are only one of several arguments why Walrasian outcomes
can arise. For our purpose, it is important that competitive outcomes occur.
In equilibrium, all entrepreneurs with projects whose returns are equal to or above r
will obtain funds and invest.
Aggregate income, denoted by Yt, is given by:
Yt = e + η(I + e) ·




The ﬁrst term represents the aggregate endowment in period t. The second term
captures the output generated by investments in the last period. Note that banks do
not need to put up equity to perform their intermediary function, as they can fully
diversify their lending activities.
4 Temporary Productivity Shocks, Contracts, and
Regulation Schemes
In this section, we consider the possibility of aggregate productivity shocks. We assume
that qτ = q in all periods τ, except period t. In period t, ¯ qt is assumed to be ¯ qh with
probability p (good state) or ¯ ql with probability 1 −p (bad state). The distribution of
the entrepreneurs’ qualities varies accordingly. We assume ¯ ql < ¯ qh. z = ¯ qh− ¯ ql denotes
the size of the shock. ¯ qe = p · ¯ qh + (1 − p)¯ ql is the average productivity of the best
possible qualities.
We maintain the assumptions that savings and investment can potentially be balanced
at positive interest rates for any of the following constellations. In particular, we
13See Stahl (1988) and Yanelle (1989 and 1997) for seminal contributions on the theory of two-sided
intermediation and Gehrig (1997) for a recent extension to diﬀerentiated bank services.
12assume that the boundary conditions (5) and (6) in the last section hold for both
shock scenarios ql and qh.
Equilibria of the intermediation game in period t−1 will now crucially depend on the
regulator’s approach to banking crises. A banking crisis occurs in our model when one
or both banks, and thus the whole banking system, is unable to repay depositors. We
distinguish between two polar cases when banking crises occur: bailout and failure.
If the regulator commits to failure, banks that are unable to satisfy depositors go
bankrupt. If the regulator commits to bailout, he will tax future generations in order
to save banks.14
With bailout, we assume that banks expect losses to be precisely recovered so that
they will have zero proﬁts in the future. If banks incur no losses in period t, they will
anticipate zero proﬁts due to Bertrand competition. The assumption ensures that we
can deﬁne an equilibrium of the ﬁnancial intermediation game for a particular period.
The focus of our paper is to compare two regulatory schemes for banking crises when
banks compete with contingent deposit and loan contracts.15
With stochastic aggregate productivity shocks, banks can oﬀer state-contingent con-
tracts in period t−1. We use C(rch
j ,rcl
j ) to denote the credit contract oﬀered by bank
j. rch
j and rcl
j denote the interest rate demanded from borrowers in the good state
and in the bad state respectively. Similarly, D(rdh
j ,rdl
j ) denotes deposit contracts with
deposit rates rdh
j and rdl
j , depending on the realization of macroeconomic shocks. We
maintain the assumption that banks are risk-neutral.16
Since consumers are risk-averse, they prefer a riskless interest rate over a lottery
{rdh
j ,rdl
j } with the same expected interest rate. We assume that the consumers’ in-
tertemporal preferences and their attitudes towards risk generate the saving function,
14While we focus on polar cases of regulatory approaches toward banking crisis, there are inter-
mediate scenarios where the regulator taxes the current generation to bail out banks. This case is
discussed in the Conclusion.
15The regulatory schemes could be endogenized in the following way. Suppose that the current
generation can determine the regulatory approach toward banking crises. If the costs in establishing
a new banking system after the failure of the existing one are negligible, the current generation will
always choose failure when faced with the case of a banking crisis. If the costs are prohibitively high
and the current and future generations are taxed in the same way to pay for the set-up costs of new
banks, existing banks would be saved.
16Since entrepreneurs as owners of banks are risk-neutral, the assumption follows naturally.
13now denoted by s{rdh
j ,rdl
j }.
The expected deposit rate is denoted by rde
j = prdh
j +(1−p)rdl
j . Similarly, the expected
interest rate on loans is given by rce
j = prch
j + (1 − p)rcl
j . To simplify notation we use
the following convention. An entrepreneur is characterized by his quality in the good
state, q ∈ [ql − 1, ql], or by his quality in the bad state, q − z ∈ [qh − 1,qh] or by his
average quality, denoted by qe, and given by
q
e = p · q + (1 − p)(q − z). (8)




j ). An entrepreneur with an
expected quality qe and associated quality q in the good state faces the following

















Note that, in the bad state, the project returns may be insuﬃcient to pay back the









= e(1 + r
de
j )
Potential entrepreneurs are risk-neutral. Thus, the comparison of the expected wealth
between investing and saving determines the critical quality level above which en-
trepreneurs choose to invest. In the following section, we examine the intermediation
game in period t − 1, depending on the size of the shock.
145 Bank Failure
We ﬁrst investigate the equilibria when insolvent banks go bankrupt.
5.1 Small Productivity Shocks
We ﬁrst consider the case where shocks are so small that funded and investing en-
trepreneurs are always able to pay back. The upper limit for small shocks will be given
in the next proposition. In this case, the critical entrepreneur in terms of expected
quality would be given by:
q
e∗ = 1 +
I min{rce




such that entrepreneurs with qe ≥ qe∗ apply for loans while entrepreneurs with qe < qe∗
save their endowments.17 Note that qe∗ implies a critical value in the good state,
denoted by q∗ and deﬁned by:
q
e∗ = pq
∗ + (1 − p)(q
∗ − z)
We ﬁrst derive the equilibrium when the regulator commits to failure. In the case of
failure, depositors know that banks can never pay back a promised deposit rate if the





j . For instance, if rdh
j > rch




Provided funds are received and credit is granted to the entrepreneur, expected proﬁts
per credit of bank j when there is no bailout amount to















The critical entrepreneur in equilibrium is denoted by qe∗
f . We obtain:
17Note that min{rce
j } is restricted to the set of banks that oﬀer the highest deposit rate, as en-
trepreneurs seeking loans will only apply at those banks.
15Proposition 2
Suppose that the regulator commits to failure. Then there exists a unique equilibrium




where rf is determined by:






























f = 1 + r
f
The proof is given in the appendix. Note that the equilibrium interest rates, the critical
entrepreneur, and the upper bound of the shock are fully determined by the exogenous
variables. The proposition implies that ﬁnancial intermediation with a commitment
to bankruptcy of insolvent banks by the regulator yields an eﬃcient intragenerational
allocation of risks for the generation under consideration. Risk-neutral entrepreneurs
can bear the entire macroeconomic risk, since they can repay the same interest rate
in both states. The productivity shock is fully absorbed by the ﬂuctuation of the
entrepreneurs’ income, which insures the banking system. Banks never default in
equilibrium.
5.2 Large Productivity Shocks
We complete our analysis with the examination of the case in which the shock is large.
If the shock is suﬃciently large, this makes complete insurance of depositors in the
failure regime impossible. The essential condition is that the wealth of entrepreneurs is
insuﬃcient to insure depositors, i.e., z ≥
e(1+rf)
p(e+I) , where rf is determined by proposition
2. We obtain:
16Proposition 3
Suppose that the regulator commits to failure and that z >
e(1+rf)
p(e+I) . Then there exists


















I(1 + rl) + (e + I)
©
zp − 1 − (1 − p)rlª
p(e + I)
(iv) rl is determined by


















f = 1 + pr
h + (1 − p)r
l =
I (1 + rl)
e + I
+ zp
The proof is given in the appendix.18
Hence, with large productivity shocks, banks oﬀer state-contingent deposit and loan
contracts. Part of the macroeconomic risk is shifted to depositors. This prevents
the aggregate risk from being shifted to future generations. Note that there is room
for further improvements in risk allocation by repackaging deposit contracts into two
securities. Risk-neutral entrepreneurs who save could hold very risky contracts, and
could bear the entire macroeconomic risk. Risk-adverse consumers could be oﬀered
less risky or even riskless contracts. This contract arrangement would further improve
intra-generational risk allocation.
18Establishing uniqueness is extremely cumbersome. Details on how to prove that other equilibria
do not exist are available upon request.
176 Bailouts
We suppose in this section that the regulator commits to bailouts. In this case, banks
might be tempted to request particularly high interests rates on loans in the good state
and a low interest rate in the bad state. It is instructive to ﬁrst show that for this
reason the eﬃcient risk allocation as expressed in proposition 2 can no longer be an
equilibrium.
Proposition 4
Suppose that the regulator commits to bailouts. Then, eﬃcient risk allocation cannot
be an equilibrium.
The proof is given in the appendix. In the next proposition we establish the equilibrium
of the game. The critical entrepreneur who is indiﬀerent between saving and applying
for a loan in the case of bailouts is denoted by qe∗
w .
Proposition 5
Suppose (qe−1−p)e+(qe−2p)I ≤ 0. Suppose that the regulator commits to bailouts.














(iii) rw is determined by
(1 − η) · s{r
w, r














w = 1 +
I{prw − (1 − p)} + erw
e + I
18The proof is given in the appendix. The intuition for this result is as follows. Under
bailout, banks wish to create a proﬁtable state, i.e., a state of the world where rch
j −
rdh
j is large, while being unconcerned about losses in the other state. In the good
state, competition drives proﬁts to zero and we have rch
j = rdh
j . In order to demand
high interest rates from entrepreneurs in one state of the world, banks do not require
any repayment in the bad state. This motivates entrepreneurs to apply for loans.
The condition in proposition 5 is fulﬁlled as long as the expected upper level of the
productivity is not too high and the probability of the good state is not too low.19
Obviously propositions 5 and 6 are extreme, since banks are able to write contracts
with entrepreneurs demanding negative interest rates in one state of the world. If we
restrict the set of contracts to non-negative interest rates, our results are qualitatively
the same, but the potential losses for future generations decrease. In the bad state
banks will demand rcl
j = 0.
An important implication of proposition 5 is that bailing out banks in the bad state
is accompanied by bailing out ﬁrms as well. Entrepreneurs pay no interest on their
loan (if rcl
j = 0) or do not have to pay anything (if rcl
j = −1) and hence can still make
proﬁts in the bad state. There are various cases where bailout guarantees for banks
and hidden subsidies to entrepreneurs have contributed to the emergence of banking
crises (see e.g. Krugman 1999 for the Asian crisis). Our analysis suggest that this
will naturally arise when banks compete with contingent contracts under a bailout
regime even if moral hazard of entrepreneurs has been eliminated since banks oﬀer
large spreads in contingent loan interest rates.
Proposition 5 holds independently of the size of the shock, provided qe fulﬁlls the afore-
mentioned condition. Thus, even if the macroeconomic risk is small, future generations
face large aggregate risks.
Proposition 5 holds even if there is no macroeconomic risk whatsoever, i.e., ¯ ql = ¯ qh.
This case occurs if there are sunspot random variables with the probability distribution
(p,1 − p), upon which banks write contingent deposit and loan contracts. Proposition
19If the condition in proposition 5 is not fulﬁlled, the results remain qualitatively the same. Banks
will still demand less repayment from entrepreneurs in the bad state . However, rcl
j = −1 is no longer
feasible in equilibrium, since the average loan interest rate would induce too much investment.
195 shows that banks generate risk for future generations. Hence, we use the term
risk-generation eﬀect rather than the well-known risk-shifting eﬀect to describe the
equilibrium outcome in proposition 5, as risk is generated even if there is no underlying
real risk. An immediate consequence is:
Proposition 6
Suppose (qe − 1 − p)e + (qe − 2p)I ≤ 0. Suppose that the regulator commits to
bailouts. In the bad state, future generations face losses equal to the savings of the
last generation.
7 Comparison
In the next proposition, we compare the interest rates and investment levels for both
regulatory schemes.
Proposition 7
The comparison between bailout and failure in the case of small productivity shocks
yields:




The proof is given in the appendix. As proposition 7 implies, under the bailout regime
the current generation invests more, compared to the bank failure regime, and deposi-
tors receive more attractive interest rates. Since entrepreneurs do not need to pay back
in one state of the world under bailout, a larger percentage of entrepreneurs choose to
invest rather than save, in comparison to the failure regime.
Proposition 7 can be interpreted as a lending boom under bailout, as aggregate credit
expands. The result complements recent important theories of lending booms (Dell’Ariccia
and Marquez (2008)). They show that lending standards may endogenously decline,
which, in turn, may increase aggregate surplus, but also the risk of ﬁnancial instability.
The disadvantage of the bailout regime in our model is that it lowers intertemporal
aggregate output. Speciﬁcally, aggregate output over two generations is higher under
20bank failure than under bailout when the second generation has to bailout the ﬁrst
generation.20 This is obvious in the simplest case when the interest elasticity of sav-
ings is zero. Then we have qe∗
w = qe∗
f and, hence, expected aggregate output in the
ﬁrst generation is the same in both regimes. In the next period, however, savings and
investment are lower in the bailout regime than in the failure regime, when the bad
state has occurred in the generation before. In the good state, output in both regimes
is identical. Hence, expected aggregate output over two generations is smaller in the
bailout regime than in the failure regime.21
8 Conclusions
We have examined the incidence of macroeconomic shocks in a model of ﬁnancial inter-
mediation under diﬀerent bailout schemes. Our analysis indicates that the combination
of allowing banks to fail, along with contingent deposit and loan contracts, tends to
yield an eﬃcient intra-generational risk allocation. Together with a large number of fur-
ther issues to be considered in banking regulation (see Dewatripont and Tirole (1994),
Hellwig (1998), and Allen and Santomero (1998)), our results may help to design an
overall second-best banking regulation scheme.
The current framework should allow for a number of useful extensions. For instance, it
may be useful to consider a wider range of macroeconomic shocks. In particular, one
could condition contracts on other contractible macroeconomic events that are highly
correlated with the ﬁnancial health of the banking sector. For instance, one might try
to use an index that measures the average default rate of entrepreneurs, or the level of
aggregate bank capital that would occur if the good state is assumed. In our model,
all these variants of macroeconomic indicators would give the same results.
20To prevent the decline in aggregate output, the regulator could ﬁx deposit rates at the level rf
from the outset. Such an ex ante deposit rate ceiling would not, however, eliminate the risk generation
incentive of banks, since banks would still like to create a proﬁtable and an unproﬁtable state of the
world on the loan side.
21The general proof is tedious. Two eﬀects occur. First, entrepreneurs with low quality (i.e.
entrepreneurs with qe∗
w < qe∗ ≤ qe∗
f ) invest in the ﬁrst generation under the bailout regime, but
not under the failure regime. Second, bailout reduces investment of entrepreneurs with higher quality
levels than qe∗
f in the second generation. Accordingly, aggregate output over two generations is higher
under the failure regime than under the bailout regime. Details are available upon request
21It is also useful to consider contingent bailout schemes. For example, one may con-
jecture that with small shocks, the regulator is expected to stay out, while with large
macroeconomic shocks, the regulator is expected to step in. Such contingent govern-
ment bailout schemes would preserve the incentives of banks to generate proﬁtable
states of the world, while large losses occur in the state where the government steps
in. Hence, contingent bailout would, at best, alleviate the risk-generation eﬀect.
Another useful extension is to consider bail-outs within a generation when entrepreneurs
(and consumers) may be taxed to bail out depositors. This implies that the current
generation has to provide rescue funds in case of bank default. This could force banks
to require a lower loan rate for the good state and may lessen the moral hazard problem,
but will not eliminate it. As long as lump-sum taxation is used, the qualitative nature
of our results as to the risk-generation eﬀect does not change. If bail-out schemes are
anticipated by agents, however, their decision problems have to be adapted before a
welfare analysis can be conducted. This subject is left for future research.
Moreover, the decision of whether or not to rescue insolvent banks may depend on the
majority voting in a particular period. It is obvious that there are conﬂicting interests
concerning the appropriate regulatory scheme. A generation supports the bailout of
banks when its individuals are old depositors. A young generation will be harmed by
taxation if they have to resolve banking crises and pay the depositors back. Hence,
regulatory schemes depend on the relative size of generations and on the potential
costs of establishing new banks. The political economy of regulatory schemes promises
useful insights into the timing of bank failures and bailouts.
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Proof of proposition 1:
We ﬁrst show the existence of the equilibrium. Note that r∗ is uniquely determined.
The boundary conditions ensure that at least one solution exists. For suﬃciently high
interest rates, investments become zero, and hence the left side of the equation for r∗
is greater than the right. For r∗ = 0, the boundary condition ensures that the right
side is greater than the left side. The mean value theorem establishes that at least one
solution exists, since both sides are continuous in r.
Moreover, the left side of the implicit equation for r∗ in proposition 1 is monotonically
increasing in r∗. In contrast, the right side is decreasing in r∗. Hence, the solution is
unique.
Loan application decisions of entrepreneurs are optimal, given rd = rc = r∗. Proﬁts of
banks per credit contract are zero (see Equ. (4)).
Changing one interest rate, while leaving the other at r∗, is never proﬁtable for a bank.
Consider a change of rd
j. Proﬁts are either negative provided rd
j > r∗, or a deviating
bank obtains no resources if rd
j < r∗. Consider a change of rc
j. Proﬁts are negative
since the interest rate margin is negative, or the deviating bank does not obtain loan
applicants due to our rationing assumption.
Suppose, however, that bank j oﬀers slightly better conditions for depositors (rd
j =
r∗ + ²) and tries to exploit its monopolistic power on the lending side, i.e., the bank
changes both interest rates.
Since bank j would obtain all deposits, entrepreneurs can only receive loans at this
bank. Hence, proﬁts of the deviating bank, denoted by πj amount to:
πj = η(¯ q − q
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j is negative if q ≤ 2.
Hence, proﬁts are decreasing for rc
j ≥ r∗ + ² with the loan interest rate. Thus, bank j
cannot make proﬁts by oﬀering rd
j = r∗ + ² and a lending rate rc
j ≥ r∗ + ². Finally, it
is obvious that setting rd
j = r∗ + ε and rc
j < r∗ + ε is not proﬁtable because proﬁts are
negative.
Uniqueness follows through similar observations. Any interest rate constellation which
would yield excess resources can be improved by a deviating bank. No interest rate
constellation with rd < rc and no excess resources can be an equilibrium. A bank can
proﬁtably deviate by setting rd + ε, (ε > 0) and rc − δ, (δ > 0), where δ must be
selected so that no excess resources occur.
Proof of proposition 2:
We observe that, given rce
j and rde
j , and hence a given critical entrepreneur qe∗ and
a given proﬁt per credit, banks can oﬀer risk-averse depositors the highest utility by
24setting rdh
j = rdl




banks are forced to oﬀer rce
j = rde
j . Raising rde
j slightly and increasing rce
j to obtain
monopoly proﬁts from entrepreneurs is not proﬁtable for the same reasons as outlined














This equilibrium interest rate is denoted by rf and determined by the saving and
investment balance. Finally, we need to verify that banks are able to pay back in both
states of the world, since otherwise their deposit rates would not be credible. In the
bad state the repayment condition is given by
(q
∗ − z)(e + I) = (q
e∗ − zp)(e + I) ≥ I (1 + r
f)




Proof of proposition 3:
a) We construct the equilibrium in the following way. In the bad state the interest
rate rl in (iii) is determined by the requirement that the critical entrepreneur can
simply pay back what he owes. We must have
(q




e = pq + (1 − p)(q − z)
which implies for the critical quality levels qe∗ = pq∗ + (1 − p)(q∗ − z)
q




e∗ − zp)(e + I) = I (1 + r
l) (14)
25Inserting qe∗ = 1 + prh + (1 − p)rl, which follows from equation (10), yields
r
h =
I (1 + rl) + (e + I)
©
zp − 1 − (1 − p)rlª
p(e + I)
which corresponds to (iii). (v) follows by solving equation (14) for qe∗.
b) For suﬃciently large productivity shocks we always have rh > rl.
Using (iii), rh > rl implies
p(e + I)r
l < p(e + I)r
h = I(1 + r
l) + (e + I)
©
zp − 1 − (1 − p)r
lª
er
l < I + (e + I)(zp − 1)
(15)
For a given rl, qe∗ is increasing in z. In order to fulﬁll the savings/investment
balance in (iv), an increase in z leads to a decline in rl. Hence, for suﬃciently
high z, equation (15) is fulﬁlled.
c) Expected proﬁts of banks are zero. Suppose bank j oﬀers deposit interest rates
rh and rl + ². Since bank j obtains all deposits, it could change the individually
optimal interest rates on loans. In order to avoid an excess resource problem,
bank j needs to ensure that enough entrepreneurs want to apply for credits.
Therefore, qe should not rise above qe∗ = 1 + prh + (1 − p)rl.
If the deviating bank wishes to achieve qe = qe∗
q
e∗ = 1 +
I rce + e ·
³
prh + (1 − p)(rl + ²)
´
e + I
= 1 + pr
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Hence, the deviation does not beneﬁt bank j. Similar reasoning for any other
potential deviation establishes that {rh,rl} is an equilibrium.
26Proof of proposition 4:
Consider the risk allocation of proposition 2. A bank j can consider the following

















where δ is larger than ². Bank j would obtain all deposits since rde
j > rf. The critical
entrepreneur amounts to
q
e∗ = 1 +
Irf + e(rf + ²)
e + I









j , bank j will not be able to pay back depositors in the second state.
However, when banks are bailed out, expected bank proﬁts per credit amount to
E(Gj) = p · I(δ − ²) (16)
For a suﬃciently small amount of ², excess resources from depositors are negligible.
However, by choosing δ > ² and making δ suﬃciently large, expected proﬁts will be
large. Hence, the proﬁtable deviation of bank j eliminates the existence of the eﬃcient
intra-generational risk allocation equilibrium.
Proof of proposition 5:
We ﬁrst observe that rw is uniquely determined. The left side of the implicit equation
for rw in proposition 5 is increasing in rw, since s{rw, rw} and qe∗
w are monotonically
increasing in rw. In contrast, the right side is decreasing in rw. The corresponding
boundary conditions ensure that a unique solution exists.






w + ² (17)
22It is straightforward, but tedious to check that any other potential deviation is not proﬁtable.
27r
cl
j = −1 (18)
The bank would obtain all resources and would try to maximize expected proﬁts by
choosing the monopoly interest rate rch
j , as entrepreneurs expect to obtain loans at the
deviating bank j only. Expected proﬁts are given by


















−(1 − η) · s{r
w + ², r








j − (1 − p)
´


















j − (1 − p)
ª
− e(r
w + ²) − pI(1 + r
ch









e − 1)(e + I) − I(2pr
ch
j + 2p − 1)
− e(p + r








e − 1 − p)(e + I) + I(1 − p)
o
≤ 0, if (¯ q
e − 1 − p)e + (¯ q
e − 2p)I ≤ 0
(20)
Note that we have used rch
j = rw = 0 and ε = 0 to obtain the inequality. Hence, the
deviation is not proﬁtable if the assumption of the proposition holds.
Proof of proposition 7:
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I rf + erf
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28Hence, using proposition 2, we obtain:
(1 − η)s{r
f,r











The strict inequality is reinforced when rf is lowered to rw in s{rw,rw} because savings
will (weakly) decline. This is, however, a contradiction to the savings and investment
balance in the bailout case. Hence we obtain rw > rf. Moreover, rw > rf implies that
qe∗
w < qe∗
f in order to balance savings and investments.
2910 Appendix B: Financial Intermediation and Con-
tracts
(solely for the Referee)
Here we brieﬂy state the underlying agency conﬂicts that provide the rationale for the
occurrence of ﬁnancial intermediation in our paper. The depositors face the follow-
ing informational asymmetries. The quality q is known to entrepreneurs but not to
depositors. Moreover, depositors cannot verify whether an entrepreneur invests. To
alleviate such agency problems in ﬁnancial contracting, ﬁnancial intermediation can
act as delegated monitoring (see Diamond (1984)). Bank activities are characterized
by two features: First, banks can verify output conditional on investment at low or
zero costs. The assumption is justiﬁed by the possibilities that banks have of secur-
ing the repayments if entrepreneurs invest. Monitoring in order to secure repayments
takes many forms: inspection of ﬁrms’ cash ﬂow when customers pay, and eﬀorts to
collateralize assets if they have been created in the process of investing and selling
products to customers. If the ﬁnal products of an entrepreneur’s project are physical
goods, such as houses or machines, standard banks can secure repayment conditional
on investment at very low costs.
Second, entrepreneurs can have large private beneﬁts if they do not invest, but banks
are able to reduce these beneﬁts by monitoring. The monitoring can take many forms.
For instance, standard banks can collateralize parts of the credit, or may release the
funds sequentially to the entrepreneur, depending on his investment behavior. Such
eﬀorts can reduce the private beneﬁts of entrepreneurs who do not invest. The simplest
monitoring function is given as follows: If a bank j oﬀers a loan I to an entrepreneur
and monitors by paying a resource cost m,m ≥ 0, it can secure a repayment of γI
with 0 < γ ≤ 1. If γ is suﬃciently high such that q(e + I) − (1 + rc)I ≥ e + (1 − γ)I,
where rc is interest on loans, an entrepreneur with quality q will invest if he obtains
a loan. We assume that monitoring technologies are eﬃcient enough in reducing the
private beneﬁts of entrepreneurs such that entrepreneurs applying for loans will always
invest.For simplicity, we also assume that monitoring outlays for a bank per credit
contract are negligible. Our analysis, however, is also applicable to the case where
30banks can completely alleviate agency problems in contracting by investing a ﬁxed
amount per credit contract in monitoring. In this case, the interest rate spread will
be positive and in equilibrium will cover the costs of monitoring.23 For simplicity of
presentation, we assume in this paper that such ﬁxed monitoring costs are zero.
We next justify the use of debt contracts in ﬁnancing entrepreneuers, either uncondi-
tional or conditional on macroeconomic shocks. A theoretical justiﬁcation is given in
Gersbach and Uhlig (2006). They abstract from monitoring as we do in this paper.
They show banks enter into a Bertrand-like competition for the diﬀerent types of invest-
ing borrowers in such games. This makes it impossible for a lender to cross-subsidize
among them. In any pure strategy equilibrium, only debt contracts will be oﬀered.
As the argument can easily be extended to banks with monitoring technologies24, we
assume directly that banks compete with debt contracts.
23A further extension could allow banks to compete on monitoring intensity, which may increase risk
generation when banks choose a low intensity of monitoring (see e.g. Gehrig and Stenbacka (2004)).
24The monitoring technology simply allows banks to reduce the cost of shirking and increases the
share of investing entrepreneurs.
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